The dual concepts of mindfulness and mindlessness are described. Mindfulness is a state of conscious awareness in which the individual is implicitly aware of the context and content of information. It is a state of openness to novelty in which the individual actively constructs categories and distinctions. In contrast, mindlessness is a state of mind characterized by an over reliance on categories and distinctions drawn in the past and in which the individual is context-dependent and, as such, is oblivious to (...) novel aspects of the situation. Mindlessness is compared to more familiar concepts such as habit, functional fixedness, overlearning, and automatic processing. Like mindlessness, these concepts concern rigid invariant behavior that occurs with little or no conscious awareness. The primary difference is that mindlessness may result from a single exposure to information. When information is given in absolute language, is given by an authority, or initially appears irrelevant, there is little manifest reason to critically examine the information and thereby recognize the ways it may be context-dependent. Instead, the individual mindlessly forms a cognitive commitment to the information and freezes its potential meaning. Alternative meanings or uses of the information become unavailable for active cognitive use. Automatic vs controlled processing, while seemingly most similar to mindlessness/mindfulness, are orthogonal to them. One can process information in a controlled but mindless manner, or automatic but mindful. Related concepts like scripts, set, expectancy, labels, and roles direct behavior, but these too may be enacted mindlessly or mindfully. The major consequences of mindlessness/mindfulness are discussed with respect to their relevance for overt behavior , memory, and health. Finally, the relationship between traditional notions of consciousness and mindfulness is briefly examined. (shrink)

When people interact with novel technologies (e.g., robots, novel technological tools), the word “creepy” regularly pops up. We define creepy situations as ambiguous situations involving uneasy feelings as eliciting uneasy feelings and involving ambiguity (e.g., on how the behave or how to judge the situation). A common metric for creepiness would help evaluating creepiness of situations and developing adequate interventions against creepiness. Following psychometrical guidelines, we developed the Creepiness of Situation Scale (CRoSS) across four studies with a total of N (...) = 882 American and German participants. In Studies 1-3, participants watched a video of a creepy situation involving technology. Study 1 used exploratory factor analysis in an American sample and showed that creepiness consists of emotional creepiness and creepy ambiguity. In a German sample, Study 2 confirmed these subdimensions. Study 3 supported validity of the CRoSS as creepiness correlated positively with privacy concerns and computer anxiety, but negatively with controllability and transparency. Study 4 used the scale in a 2 (male vs. female experimenter) x 2 (male vs. female participant) x 2 (day vs. night) field study to demonstrate its usefulness for non-technological settings and its sensitivity to theory-based predictions. Results indicate that participants contacted by an experimenter at night-time reported higher feelings of creepiness. Overall, these studies suggest that the CRoSS is a psychometrically sound measure for research and practice. (shrink)

Je me propose de réfléchir ici sur une éthique pour notre temps, un temps où l'on reconnaît à chacun de nous la liberté de trouver sa propre voie, ses propres sources d'épanouissement, de choisir la forme d'existence qui lui convient. Il importe, m'a-t-il semblé, de déterminer et de s'approprier dès lors une éthique véritablement compatible avec des existences faites sur mesure, une éthique à laquelle chacun, malgré sa singularité, peut s'identifier. Où est le droit chemin quand tant de parcours différents (...) sont possibles? Quels jugements moraux porter sur ses semblables quand ils se comportent de manière si dissemblable? Quelle éthique convient-il de se donner pour vivre de manière constructive dans un monde en constante évolution sociale, technologique et scientifique? Comment surmonter la crise des valeurs que plusieurs considèrent comme caractéristique de notre époque? La réponse réside dans ce que j'appellerai une éthique de la coexistence. L'idée centrale en est la suivante : ce qui compte moralement, ce n'est pas la manière dont on existe (individuellement), mais la manière dont on coexiste. A mon sens, une éthique nous parlera d'autant plus aujourd'hui qu'elle ambitionnera d'en dire le moins sur ce que c'est que d'être homme ou femme, qu'elle spéculera le moins possible au niveau métaphysique, pour porter toute son attention sur la relation entre les humains et sur leur diversité. C'est à ce prix qu'il est possible de donner véritablement un sens concret à la liberté individuelle et au principe d'égalité sans rien enlever à la solidarité humaine. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Susanne Langer in Focus: The Symbolic MindMary J. ReichlingRobert E. Innis, Susanne Langer in Focus: The Symbolic Mind (Indiana University Press: Indianapolis, 2009)The very first sentence of this book establishes the author's goal: "to bring as clearly as possible the total range of Susanne Langer's work 'into focus'" (p. xi). Such an aim strains credulity when one is familiar with the depth, breadth, and complexity (...) of Langer's philosophy as it encompasses her complete works. Yet, Innis manages to trace the development of Langer's thought from its roots in her earliest work, The Practice of Philosophy, through the intervening books, and concluding with her theory of mind and the three volumes of Mind: An Essay on Human Feeling. Susanne Langer in Focus is the most comprehensive analysis of the progression of Langer's thought I have found to date. It is a project of Herculean proportion and one which Innis accomplishes quite well in a lucid and scholarly, though sometimes pedantic, manner despite some matters that I wish to pursue more fully.However it is important to note at the outset that Innis sharply limits his use of secondary sources and prefers to restrict involvement with "scholarly quarrels" thus choosing not to engage with Langer's detractors (p. xi). This was a disappointment for me because I share Innis's advocacy with respect to Langer's aesthetic theory and would appreciate a voice as knowledgeable and well grounded [End Page 213] as his taking on some of these arguments. Nevertheless, Langer has long been popular among musicians and music educators who will find here a sensitive and penetrating presentation of Langer's aesthetic theory and an analysis of music specifically as a paradigm for that theory.The text is divided into nine chapters preceded by an interesting biographical sketch of Langer. It appears to me that these chapters group nicely into three sections, my division, not Innis's. The first includes chapters one and two concerned with the origins of Langer's philosophy and symbol theory as found in The Practice of Philosophy, Introduction to Symbolic Logic, and to some extent, Philosophy in a New Key. The second embraces chapters three, four, and five giving primary consideration to her non-discursive or presentational symbolism, symbolic transformation, ritual, myth, and art as found in Philosophy in a New Key and Feeling and Form. The third section, chapter six, seven, and eight, is devoted to Langer's trilogy, the three volumes of Mind. A short ninth chapter concludes the book with Innes's perspective on the dimensions and position of Langer's philosophical undertaking in the broader context of philosophy in general.That said, I now wish to offer my take on some of the fruits of Innes's harvest examining each of the orchards (sections) in turn. At the outset, Innis stresses Langer's view of the position and purpose of philosophy stating that it embraces all the rational sciences in a systematic study of meaning. In fact for Langer, the logical analysis is to philosophy what observation is to science, a first step. This relation, as a kind of dialectical tension between philosophy and science, especially with respect to method, is one of Langer's major contributions as Innis points out much later in his concluding chapter. What I find quite helpful, though, is Innis's explanation of Langer's concept of a type of understanding that is non-discursive. This provides an epistemological basis for the nature of myth and art, so critical, in my opinion, to grasping Langer's theory of music as a symbol of feeling. (But I am ahead of Innis.)Innis shows that Langer's theory is grounded empirically in the psychology of perception and imagination because these allow the perceiver to abstract meaning from the form that embodies it. He continues illuminating and clarifying several terms such as abstraction, projection, semblance, virtual image, imagination, illusion, and more. His discussion of metaphor, primarily as it relates to Langer's theory of presentational symbolism, is extremely well done. His emphasis on metaphor as more than a mode of inquiry is particularly significant. Few, if any, writers about Langer... (shrink)

Conceptualism is the view that at least some perceptual representation is conceptual. This paper considers a prominent recent argument against Conceptualism due to Ned Block. Block’s argument appeals to patterns of color representation in infants, alleging that infants exhibit categorical perception of color while failing to deploy concepts of color categories. Accordingly, the perceptual representation of color categories in infancy must be non-conceptual. This argument is distinctive insofar as it threatens not only the view that all perception is conceptual, but (...) also views that restrict the Conceptualist thesis to perceptual categorization. However, I contend that it fails at two stages. Block’s arguments for the perceptual representation of color categories in infancy, and against color concept deployment in infancy, are unpersuasive. Thus, Block has not vanquished Conceptualism. I draw out implications for debates about the perception-cognition border and for the question of whether explicit categorization occurs in perception. (shrink)

A venerable view holds that a border between perception and cognition is built into our cognitive architecture and that this imposes limits on the way information can flow between them. While the deliverances of perception are freely available for use in reasoning and inference, there are strict constraints on information flow in the opposite direction. Despite its plausibility, this approach to the perception-cognition border has faced criticism in recent years. This article develops an updated version of the architectural approach, which (...) I call the dimension restriction hypothesis (DRH). According to DRH, perceptual processes are constrained to compute over a bounded range of dimensions, while cognitive processes are not. This view allows that perception is cognitively penetrable, but places strict limits on the varieties of penetration that can occur. The article argues that DRH enjoys both theoretical and empirical support, and also defends the view against several objections. (shrink)

As thinkers in the market for knowledge and agents aspiring to morally responsible action, we are inevitably subject to luck. This book presents a comprehensive new theory of luck in light of a critical appraisal of the literature's leading accounts, then brings this new theory to bear on issues in the theory of knowledge and philosophy of action.

Christopher Hill's Perceptual experience is a must‐read for philosophers of mind and cognitive science. Here I consider Hill's representationalist account of spatial perception. I distinguish two theses defended in the book. The first is that perceptual experience does not represent the enduring, intrinsic properties of objects, such as intrinsic shape or size. The second is that perceptual experience does represent certain viewpoint‐dependent properties of objects—namely, Thouless properties. I argue that Hill's arguments do not establish the first thesis, and then I (...) raise questions about the Thouless‐property view and its role in Hill's defense of representationalism. (shrink)

De Bie et al. (2023) propose an organizing framework for different stages of human gestational development from conception to the viable premature. They also identify ethical considerations and con...

'Object' and 'criterion of identity' are philosophical terms of art whose application lies at a considerable theoretical remove from the surface phenomena of everyday linguistic usage. This partly explains their highly controversial status, for their point of application lies precisely where the concerns of linguists and philosophers of language merge with those of metaphysicians. This chapter explains the possession of determinate identity‐conditions. It argues that the distinction between 'abstract' and 'concrete' objects is itself a highly controversial one, and although it (...) has indeed been argued that this distinction turns ultimately upon differences between the criteria of identity governing objects of these two broad categories. It examines the role which criteria of identity play in our talk about objects of the least controversial varieties. The chapter concerns the problem of identity over time and the paradoxes to which identity criteria often appear to give rise when time is brought into the picture. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: The Syntax and Semantics of Complex Sortal Terms On the Identity of Sorts.

Some philosophers have suggested that certain shifts in perceptual organization are counterexamples to representationalism about phenomenal character. Representationalism about phenomenal character is, roughly, the view that there can be no difference in the phenomenal character of experience without a difference in the representational content of experience. In this paper, I examine three of these alleged counterexamples: the dot array (Peacocke 1983), the intersecting lines (Speaks 2010), and the 3 X 3 grid (Nickel 2007). I identify the two features of their (...) phenomenology that call for explanation: grouping and prominence. I then argue that representationalists can adequately account for both of these features. I also critique some previous treatments of grouping and prominence. (shrink)

There is a widespread assumption that the classical work in philosophical semantics of Saul Kripke (1980) and Hilary Putnam (1975) has taught us that the essences of natural kinds of substances, such as water and gold, are discoverable only a posteriori by scientific investigation. It is such investigation, thus, that has supposedly revealed to us that it is an essential property of water that it is composed of H2O molecules. This is the way in which Scott Soames, in a recent (...) paper, makes the point in the case of water and H2O: [Here is] how a Kripkean explanation of the necessary a posteriority of [‘Water = H2O’] would go – or at any rate my version of it. The account holds that ‘water’ is a non-descriptive, directly-referential term designating a substance – where substances are taken to be physically constitutive kinds (instances of which share the same basic physical constitution). It is further assumed that a kind of this sort may have different instances in different world-states, and that if a and b are kinds with the same instances in all possible world-states, then a is b. These are clearly metaphysical assumptions, to which we add the natural corollary that for any substance, s, if, in some possible world-state, instances of s have a certain molecular structure, then instances of s have that structure in every world-state. In other words, we assume that it is an essential property of a substance that instances of it have the molecular structure they do. From this it follows that [‘Water = H2O’] is necessary if true, and that ‘H2O’– which I take to be equivalent to ‘the substance instances of which have a molecular structure with two hydrogen atoms and one oxygen atom’– is a rigid designator. Being true, [‘Water = H2O’] is, therefore, necessary. Since knowing the proposition it expresses requires knowing of a certain substance that its instances have a particular chemical structure, [‘Water = H2O’] is knowable only a posteriori. (Soames 2007: 36). (shrink)

Sustainable development (SD) – that is, “Development that meets the needs of current generations without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their needs and aspirations” – can be pursued in many different ways. Stakeholder relations management (SRM) is one such way, through which corporations are confronted with economic, social, and environmental stakeholder claims. This paper lays the groundwork for an empirical analysis of the question of how far SD can be achieved through SRM. It describes the so-called SD–SRM (...) perspective as a distinctive research approach and shows how it relates to the wider body of stakeholder theory. Next, the concept of SD is operationalized for the microeconomic level with reference to important documents. Based on the ensuing SD framework, it is shown how SD and SRM relate to each other, and how the two concepts relate to other popular concepts such as Corporate Sustainability and Corporate Social Responsibility. The paper concludes that the significance of societal guiding models such as SD and of management approaches like CSR is strongly dependent on their footing in society. (shrink)

An individual, as this term will be understood here, is an entity to which the concepts of unity and identity fully and determinately apply. That is to say, an entity x is an individual just in case x determinately counts as one entity and x has a determinate identity. Many philosophers tacitly assume that all entities are individuals in the foregoing sense, and indeed that it is a necessary truth that they are. But this can certainly be disputed. It is, (...) very arguably, both logically and metaphysically possible for there to be nonindividuals. The aim of this chapter is to clarify and explore both the notion of an individual and that of a nonindividual, to propose a typology of entities based on the individual/nonindividual distinction, and to illustrate the potential of these notions for application within and across the sciences. (shrink)

Molyneux’s question asks whether a person born blind who has learned to identify shapes by touch could, if suddenly granted sight, immediately identify shapes visually. This question has often been used to structure discussions of whether there is a “rational connection” between sight and touch—whether it is possible to rationally doubt whether the same shape properties are both seen and felt. I distinguish two questions under this general heading. The first concerns, roughly, whether the visual and haptic perception of shape (...) is rationally connected in normally sighted perceivers. The second concerns, roughly, whether the visual and haptic perception of shape is rationally connected in all possible perceivers. I argue that real-world implementations of Molyneux’s question are irrelevant to the first question, but potentially relevant to the second. However, I also argue that the second question does not have the philosophical significance it is sometimes claimed to have. In particular, it cannot be used to adjudicate debates about whether the phenomenal character of perceptual experience is primarily determined “externally” by the worldly properties we perceive, or “internally” by physiological or functional properties of our brains. (shrink)

One currently popular methodology of metaphysics has it that ‘intuitions’ play an evidential role with respect to metaphysical claims. This chapter defends a realist methodology of metaphysics that implies that any rational being, simply in virtue of being rational, is necessarily capable of grasping the essences of at least some mind-independent entities. The notion of essence in play here is Aristotelian, whereby an entity’s essence is captured by an account of what that entity is, or what it is to be (...) that entity. Concepts are just ways of thinking of things and, as such, may or may not be adequate to the real natures — the essences — of the things being thought of. Our ‘intuitions’, particularly as revealed by aptly constructed thought experiments, may cast interesting light on some of our concepts, but they are not and cannot be reliable guides to mind-independent truths of essence. (shrink)

Based on a theoretical exploration in a previous article, this paper empirically analyzes which issues of SD are taken into account by corporations and stakeholders in what way, and to what extent the concept of sustainable development (SD) can be achieved through stakeholder relations management (SRM) on the corporate level. An important basis for this empirical analysis is a referential framework, which specifies 14 issues of SD. In a first empirical step, the literature-based framework has been operationalized for the business (...) world by analyzing sustainability reports. In a second empirical step, the operationalized framework served as the basis for a survey of selected MNCs. The analyses of the sustainability reports and the survey show how MNCs deal with particular issues of SD and what role they perceive particular stakeholders play. A key conclusion of the article is that SRM indeed promotes SD, but that it is no alternative to predictable government regulation. (shrink)

This paper has two main parts. In the first part, I argue that prominent moves in two related current debates in epistemology—viz., the debates over classical invariantism and the knowledge first movement—depend on one or the other of two claims about epistemic propriety: (1) Impropriety due to lack of a particular epistemic feature suffices for epistemic impropriety; and (2) Having justification to believe P suffices for having warrant to assert P. In the second part, I present and defend novel arguments (...) against both claims. (shrink)

Construing miracles as \textquotedblleft{}violations,\textquotedblright I argue that a law of nature must specify some kind of possibility. But we must have here a sense of possibility for which the ancient rule of logic---ab esse ad posse valet consequentia---does not hold. We already have one example associated with the concept of statute law, a law which specifies what is legally possible but which is not destroyed by a violation. If laws of nature are construed as specifying some analogous sense of what (...) is naturally possible, then they need not be invalidated by a (rare) violation, and Humean miracles remain a genuine possibility. (shrink)

It is a matter of dispute whether we should acknowledge the existence of two distinct species of causation – event causation and agent causation – and, if we should, whether either species of causation is reducible to the other. In this paper, the prospects for such a reduction either way are considered, the conclusion being that a reduction of event causation to agent causation is the more promising option. Agent causation, in the sense understood here, is taken to include but (...) not to be restricted to the intentional causation of an event by a rational agent. But, it is argued, there are certain special features of intentional causation, understood as a sub-species of agent causation, which make the agent-causation approach to human agency a particularly promising one with which to tackle the problem of free will. (shrink)

Autora: Susanne Katherina Langer Tradução: Clovis Salgado Gontijo Oliveira Obra: LANGER, Susanne Katherina. The Lord of Creation. Fortune Magazine, v. 30. P. 127-154. 1944. O senhor da Criação Resumo: Neste artigo, publicado pela revista Fortune em 1944, a filósofa estadunidense Susanne K. Langer retoma temas fundamentais de sua obra mais célebre, Filosofia em nova chave, cuja primeira edição data de 1942. Em linguagem acessível destinada a público não especializado, a autora sintetiza sua concepção antropológica, visitando questões como (...) a especificidade de nossa mentalidade; a distinção entre os signos e os símbolos, assim como entre as esferas do real e do possível; a transformação simbólica; a essência da linguagem; a relevância de formas articuladas não discursivas para a expressão e a cognição humanas; a conexão entre a razão e a loucura. Para além de uma mera síntese, Langer relaciona, de modo sagaz e oportuno, tais aspectos ao período de guerra no qual escreveu este artigo, ao observar, como sintoma da crise cultural de então, a perda de referências simbólicas e a substituição dos antigos símbolos (míticos e religiosos) por aquele do nacionalismo. Palavras-chave: Expressão; Signo; Símbolo; Linguagem; Crise da Cultura The Lord of Creation Abstract: The American philosopher Susanne K. Langer reviews, in this article, published by Fortune Magazine in 1944, some fundamental themes of her most renowned work, Philosophy in a New Key, firstly edited in 1942. The author sums up her anthropological conception, through an accessible language intended to a general public, examining topics such as the specific trait of our mentality; the distinction between signs and symbols, as well as between the domains of the real and the possible; symbolic transformation; the essence of language; the importance of non-discursive articulate forms for human expression and cognition; the relationship between reason and lunacy. In addition to that synthesis, Langer relates those aspects, in an insightful and opportune way, to the war period when this article was written, observing, as a symptom of the cultural crisis of that time, the loss of symbolic references and the substitution of the old symbols (mythical and religious) for the one of nationalism. Keywords: Expression; Sign; Symbol; Language; Crisis of Culture El Señor de la Creación Resumen: En este artículo, publicado por la revista Fortune en 1944, la filósofa estadounidense Susanne K. Langer reanuda temas fundamentales de su más célebre obra, Nueva clave de la filosofía, cuya primera edición data de 1942. Por medio de un lenguaje accesible destinado a un público no especializado, la autora sintetiza su concepción antropológica, examinando cuestiones como la especificidad de nuestra mentalidad; la distinción entre los signos y los símbolos, así como entre los campos de lo real y de lo posible; la transformación simbólica; la esencia del lenguaje; el importante rol de las formas articuladas no discursivas para la expresión y la cognición humanas; la conexión entre razón y locura. Más que una mera síntesis, Langer relaciona esos aspectos de modo agudo y oportuno, al período de guerra en el cual escribió este artículo, al observar, como síntoma de la crisis cultural de entonces, la pérdida de referencias simbólicas y la sustitución de los antiguos símbolos (míticos y religiosos) por aquel del nacionalismo. Palabras clave: Expresión; Signo; Símbolo; Lenguaje; Crisis de la Cultura Data de registro: 28/10/2022 Data de aceite: 01/02/2023. (shrink)

This paper challenges David Chalmers' proposed division of the problems of consciousness into the `easy' ones and the `hard' one, the former allegedly being susceptible to explanation in terms of computational or neural mechanisms and the latter supposedly turning on the fact that experiential `qualia' resist any sort of functional definition. Such a division, it is argued, rests upon a misrepresention of the nature of human cognition and experience and their intimate interrelationship, thereby neglecting a vitally important insight of Kant. (...) From a Kantian perspective, our capacity for conceptual thought is so inextricably bound up with our capacity for phenomenal consciousness that it is an illusion to imagine that there are any `easy' problems of consciousness, resolvable within the computational or neural paradigms. (shrink)